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RESPONSE TO STATEMENT OF FACTS
Caspers' Statement of Facts, adopted by Wrights, focuses on
the propriety of the defendants' actions, and cites the facts most
favorable to the defendants.

The truth of those claims is not at

issue at this stage of the litigation.

"[S]tanding in no way

depends on the merits" of the case. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,
500 (1975) .

"For purposes of ruling on a motion to dismiss for

want of standing, both the trial and reviewing courts must accept
as true all material allegations of the complaint, and must
construe the complaint in favor of the complaining party."
422 U.S. at 501.

Id. ,

Defendants

particularly

emphasize

their

claim

that

all

necessary authorizations for the plat change were obtained before
Triesaults

purchased

their

lot.

(Caspers'

brief

4-5.)

The

complaint alleges, however, that those authorizations, at least in
the case of Bakers, were obtained by misrepresentations and other
misconduct by Caspers and Wrights.

(Amended Complaint ff 3 0.e, 35,

37 (R. 722-21), copy attached to plaintiffs/ initial brief.)
Wrights charge that plaintiffs have mischaracterized George
Wright's statements regarding funds from the sale of the new lot,
and now claim that he said only part of the proceeds would be used
for the benefit of the PUD.

(Wrights' brief 8.)

cites to George Wright's deposition testimony.

Wrights' brief
The complaint,

however, alleges that "the proceeds" (i.e., all the proceeds) from
the sale would be used for the PUD.

(R. 725.)

Even if Wright's

testimony were controlling, plaintiffs would still have a valid
claim,

for

Wright

admitted

that

he

did

not

perform

all

the

landscaping he agreed to do in exchange for the sale of the lot.
(R. 164-63.)
ARGUMENT
POINT I:
PLAINTIFFS' BRIEF PRESERVED THEIR
CLAIMS FOR PERSONAL DAMAGES.
Wrights assert that Triesaults' personal claims against George
Wright relating to "picking cherries, Forest Service boundaries,
storage buildings, and the access road . . . were not preserved on
appeal or addressed in Appellants' brief."
This statement is just plain wrong.

(Wrights' brief 11.)

Point I of Triesaults' brief

focuses on those very claims. The paragraph of the complaint containing those allegations was quoted on page 12 of Triesaults'
brief.
POINT II:
A.

PLAINTIFFS HAVE STANDING.

Plaintiffs7 interests were adverse to defendants.

Kennecott Corp. V. Salt Lake County. 702 P.2d 451 (Utah 1985),
states two requirements for standing:

"that (1) the interests of

the parties be adverse, and (b) the parties seeking relief have a
legally protectible interest in the controversy."
The

evident

purpose

collusive suits.

of

the

first

requirement

702 P.2d at 454.
is

to

There must be a genuine controversy.

prevent
In an

effort to show that this element is not satisfied, however, Caspers
argue the merits of the case.

Caspers appear to assert that

plaintiffs did not have an adverse interest because plaintiffs
would lose.

As stated above, "standing in no way depends on the

merits" of the case.

Warth v. Seldin. 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975).*

The allegations of the complaint establish that adversity exists.
In addition, a review of Caspers' argument reveals a misunderstanding of the issue before this Court.
summary judgment solely on standing.

This case was decided by

The merits of the case have

never been properly before the trial court for resolution.

It is

therefore improper to argue that Triesaults should have realized
there was going to be a change in the plat, or that Wright was
acting on his own and not as an officer of QMF.

1

These are issues

Warth was cited approvingly by the Utah Supreme Court in Jenkins
v. Swan, 675 P.2d 145, 1149 (Utah 1983).

which may arise at trial, but their resolution is not important at
this stage of the litigation.

Plaintiffs alleged that Wright was

acting on behalf of QMF and Casper. (E.g., Amended Complaint f 14
(R. 727) .) That allegation must be accepted as true by this Court.
B.

Plaintiffs have a legally protectible interest.

Defendants argue that only the executive committee would have
standing to assert claims on behalf of the homeowners.
brief 12.)

(Caspers'

This argument ignores (1) the fact that certain of

plaintiffs' claims could not have been raised by the executive
committee and (2) the principle that the existence of standing in
the executive committee does not preclude individual homeowners
from having standing.
Bakers' claim, that Bakers approval of the amended plat was
induced by Wright's false representations to Bakers, is a claim
that only Bakers could bring.

Similarly, only Triesaults had

standing to pursue their claim that Wright fraudulently induced
Triesaults' signatures on a quit claim deed. Plaintiffs, and only
plaintiffs, had standing to bring these claims.
The authority granted to the executive committee did not
preclude plaintiffs from acting. The PUD agreement does state that
the executive committee

"shall" conduct the business of the

association, but that does not preclude individuals from also
acting to protect their own interests. The term as used in the PUD
agreement is permissive:
committee to act.

it grants authority to the executive

Nothing in the PUD agreement precludes in-

dividuals from also acting where such individuals have a sufficient

personal interest.

See Hansen v. Utah State Retirement Board, 652

P.2d 1332, 1342 (Utah 1982) (Crockett, J., concurring) (provision
that

attorney

general

"shall" be the

legal

advisor

of

state

officers was permissive, not mandatory) ; Bird & Jex Co. v. Funk, 96
Utah 450, 85 P.2d 831, 836-37 (1939) (statute providing that beer
advertising

"shall

be permitted

under

such

regulation

as

the

commission may make" was permissive, not mandatory).
The

court

in Brickyard

Homeowners/

Assoc. Mctmt Comm.

v.

Gibbons Realty Co. . 668 P.2d 535 (Utah 1983), held that the statute
under

consideration

committee

"without

there

granted

limiting

the

standing

rights

initiate suit on his own behalf."

of

to
any

the
unit

668 P. 2d at 538.

management
owner

to

The same

result should obtain here. Plaintiffs had standing to pursue their
claims because plaintiffs' interests were adverse to defendants,
and plaintiffs had a legally protectible interest in the controversy.
POINT III: PLAINTIFFS' MINORITY POSITION DOES
NOT DEFEAT THEIR CLAIM.
Point III of plaintiffs' initial brief, Point III of Caspers'
brief, and Point IV of Wrights' brief discuss whether there was a
proper vote of the homeowners. To properly evaluate this issue, it
is important to review how it arose.
"Mapleton City required QMF, Inc. to obtain authorization of
all the lot owners in order to change the plat."
at 4, citing R. 505; emphasis added.)

(Caspers' brief

Later, "the title company

requested that all lot owners sign a quit-claim deed conveying

property to QMF, Inc. so the amended plat could be reconveyed in a
proper manner to all of the lot owners."
citing R.

439; emphasis added.)

(Caspers7 brief at 5,

Bakers signed

the

initial

authorization given to Mapleton City, and Triesaults and Bakers
signed the quit claim deed given to the title company. Plaintiffs'
complaint alleges those signatures were obtained by fraud.
As a claimed defense to plaintiffs7 lawsuit, defendants argued
that any fraud was harmless because plaintiffs7 signatures were not
necessary—the owners of the eight other lots all supported George
Wright7s actions.

The PUD agreement and the condominium statutes

each require only a three-quarter majority for plat amendments.
Eight lots is greater than a three-quarter majority; therefore,
argue

defendants, the plat

could

have

been

changed

without

plaintiffs7 consent and any fraud in inducing that consent was
harmless.
The trial court adopted defendants7 argument.

The court

stated:
Although no official vote was taken, the Court
received affidavits from eight of the ten
property owners . . . .
This Court finds
that, because at least three-fourths of the
property owners agreed to the property disposal, the Court accepts the affidavits as
affirmative votes which effectively bind all
property owners, including the Plaintiffs.
(R. 901.)
To challenge this "finding" of the trial court, plaintiffs
argued in their brief that "votes" can only be taken in a meeting.
Caspers now claim this argument was not timely raised.
Caspers, however, who raised the argument below.

It was

Plaintiffs were

not required to "raise" the argument.

In any event, the trial

court's decision shows that plaintiffs' arguments were made and
considered by the court below.
The

discussion

about

votes

is, however,

a

red

herring.

Plaintiffs made the argument only to respond to the trial court's
decision.

The real issue before this Court is standing, not the

merits of the lawsuit per se.

Regardless of whether Mapleton City

or the title company needed to require approval by all lot owners,
the fact is the city and title company did require such unanimous
approval.

Plaintiffs have alleged fraudulent procurement of their

signatures.
true.

This Court is required to accept that allegation as

Plaintiffs, and only plaintiffs, clearly have standing to

pursue those claims.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs had standing, both for private wrongs and for
wrongs to all homeowners in the PUD.
their claims.

Plaintiffs did not waive

The dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint should be

reversed.
DATED this

^ ^ ^" day of December, 1997.
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